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Abstract. This essay explores the contention that posthuman subjects, such as androids, clones, and 
robots, can experience psychological trauma. The aim of the paper is to examine this notion in three 
science fiction texts: Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, Philip K. Dick’s Do Androids Dream of Electric 
Sheep?, and Ursula K. Le Guin’s short story ‘Nine Lives’. What these narratives illustrate is that trauma 
manifestations can contribute to a disruption of ontological frameworks that maintain categories such 
as ‘human’ and ‘non-human’ as permanent and distinct. As a result, it might be argued that these texts 
undermine anthropocentrism and invite a reconceptualising around the term ‘human’, but also around 
trauma, conventionally understood as a primarily human experience. Science fiction is thereby a signif-
icant genre when it comes to questioning anthropocentric perspectives. Using posthuman theory and 
trauma studies, this essay argues that these three texts portray their respective posthuman subjects 
as trauma victims, and further that they demonstrate how the experience of trauma carries with it the 
potential to bridge the gap between human and posthuman through the act of bearing witness to one 
another’s trauma. 
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Introduction 
The term ‘Anthropocene’ was popularised by Nobel-winning chemist Paul Crutzen 
around the turn of the millennium, denoting what many scholars now consider the ap-
propriate name for our current geological epoch. What defines the Anthropocene is how 
human activity has altered Earth’s climate and atmosphere to the extent that human-
kind must consider itself a direct geophysical force and an incontrovertible influence 
on the environment (Crutzen, 2002, 23). If this is indeed the case, the ‘discovery’ of 
the Anthropocene should serve as the impetus to abandon the notion of human excep-
tionalism. Humanities research, literary studies included, is required to take this into 
account. Among the currently expanding fields within the study of literature is trau-
ma studies, committed to exploring literary representations of psychological trauma. 
Considering the implications of the Anthropocene, however, one might argue that the 
field’s focus is highly anthropocentric. This is perhaps not surprisingly also the case for 
most psychoanalytic criticism, as we tend to think of the mind, the unconscious, and 
emotional intelligence as something uniquely and definingly human. How can a robot, 
for instance, be capable of repressing traumatic memories? This is hardly something we 
can imagine in today’s technologies, despite the rapid development of computers that 
are becoming increasingly mind-like. However, these are scenarios that science fiction 
texts have already been exploring for decades. Scholars should therefore discard what 
Roger Luckhurst (2014) has described as a ‘high cultural suspicion of SF’, which per-
haps has prevented science fiction texts from being fully explored in the past (5), and 
should devote more attention to the issues that sci-fi has raised and to how the genre can 
contribute to dissolving the foundations of anthropocentric perspectives.
A small amount of research has already examined the notion of posthuman trauma 
to a certain extent. In his article ‘Posthuman Wounds’ (2014), Tony M. Vinci argues 
that the human characters of Philip K. Dick’s novel Do Androids Dream of Electric 
Sheep? (1968) practice a form of trauma deferment by using androids and animals as 
scapegoats, and thus uphold an ontological framework that promotes human excep-
tionalism (93). Vinci also briefly speculates about the androids’ potential to experience 
trauma themselves: ‘what would it mean if the android could indeed be possessed by 
the traumatic event while also fully inhabiting the traumatic moment? In other words, 
what if the android were not only “witnessing” human events, but experiencing its own 
trauma as well?’ (2014, 97). This is an intriguing question, and one which will serve as 
the main focus of this essay. Whereas Vinci’s article is primarily interested in human 
trauma, this essay seeks to elaborate on posthuman trauma by examining various sci-fi 
narratives that feature traumatised posthuman subjects, and to draw attention to the dif-
ferent ways in which these traumas manifest. The essay aims to consider the Creature 
from Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818), the androids featured in Philip K. Dick’s 
Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, and Kaph, the clone from Ursula K. Le Guin’s 
short story ‘Nine Lives’ (1969). By synthesising trauma studies with theories loosely 
centred around posthumanism, the essay will show that the above-mentioned texts 
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suggest that manufactured posthuman subjects are indeed able to experience trauma in 
different manners, and that this contributes to a blurring of the boundaries between ma-
chines and humans, thus undermining anthropocentrism. Further, one might argue that 
the texts also illustrate how trauma in the posthuman subject provides opportunities for 
humans to bear witness to the Other’s suffering, and hence the experience of trauma 
establishes a platform for encounters where the human’s fear of the posthuman Other 
transforms into understanding and compassion. This is also the outcome when both 
human and posthuman are victims of trauma, and are able to connect in their mutual 
experience, as some of the texts show.
Trauma and Technology 
In the past, trauma studies have been concerned with topics such as political conflict, 
war, violence, terror, and the Holocaust. With regard to the relationship between trauma 
and technology, one might argue that the latter has indirectly been regarded as contrib-
uting to psychological trauma, although there is much potential in focusing more closely 
on the role of technology in trauma studies. Indeed, Roger Luckhurst (2005) has advo-
cated the necessity for more research incorporating science fiction texts into the field (5). 
Luckhurst, in his tracing of the cultural history of science fiction, asserts how technology 
has conventionally been regarded as a cause of psychological trauma (2005, 27). Walter 
Benjamin, for instance, famously paints a picture of the modern urban experience where 
crowds, cameras, films, and traffic cause the individual to experience ‘a series of shocks 
and collisions’ (Benjamin 2006, 27). Modern technology has therefore been seen as in-
herently traumatic for the human individual, and has been understood to cause trauma. 
This is perhaps also apparent in Freud’s famous railway accident example, where he 
illustrates how accidents may lead to symptoms of trauma; what causes the traumatis-
ing accident is the technology of the railway. It may be suggested, however, that the 
development of technology has come so far that it might be time to reverse our thinking 
about the trauma/technology relationship. An idea that may be considered is that instead 
of technology causing human trauma, we are now the ones who traumatise technology. 
What if technology, in the form of computers and robots, has evolved to the point where 
it possesses the ability to become traumatised? This trajectory of thought is one that 
ought to be considered in an attempt to debunk anthropocentrism and to investigate and 
broaden the categories of ‘trauma’, ‘human’, and ‘posthuman’. 
Upon closer inspection, these scenarios are not as bizarre as they sound because the 
fact is that mind-like computers are already in the process of construction. Robots and 
computers are now functioning with such complexity and sophistication that they are 
close to replicating human characteristics and abilities. In his overview of the possibil-
ities of cognitive computing and cognitive systems, Ahmed K. Noor (2015) explains 
that these new computer systems are designed to work like the human brain, or rather, 
the human mind. ‘Deeper biological understanding of how the brain worked allowed 






Do Androids Have Nightmares About Electric Sheep? Science Fiction Portrayals…
scientists to build computer systems modelled after the mind, and most importantly 
to build a computer that could integrate past experience into its system’, Noor states 
(76). Through developments in the incorporation of neural networks into computers, 
‘researchers argue that the brain is a type of machine, and can therefore potentially be 
replicated’ (Noor 2015, 76). The notion of technological adaptation of human abilities 
and mental properties has, however, been introduced decades earlier, as illustrated by, 
for instance, the anthology Android Epistemology (1995), edited by Kenneth M. Ford, 
Clark N. Glymour, and Patrick J. Hayes. The anthology contains Herbert A. Simon’s 
article ‘Machine as Mind’, which presents the thesis that the acquisition of a mind 
is achievable for computers because the human brain is replicable: ‘the materials of 
thoughts are symbols – patterns, which can be replicated in a great variety of materials 
(including neurons and chips)’ (1995, 25). Simon further criticises sceptics of this idea 
for having a romanticised understanding of the human mind (1995, 38). Both Simon’s 
and Noor’s work, then, demonstrate that posthuman intelligence is not located in the 
realm of distant future, and that today’s advancements in cognitive computers under-
score the necessity of reflection around these issues. If computational machines are 
becoming intelligent and capable of storing memories, then our notion of the psyche 
needs to be altered to include posthuman subjectivity. As Noor points out, trauma in 
computers, robots, and androids, may soon become an actuality, and we should there-
fore dismiss the thought of trauma as a uniquely human experience. 
This is where literature, and especially science fiction, can provide valuable knowl-
edge. Luckhurst (2014) has argued that the study of science fiction within a trauma stud-
ies framework can lead to significant insights into the trauma concept because the gen-
re ‘dismantle[s] any recognizable human subject in challenging ways […] as imagined 
futures outgrow the psychodynamic frameworks that dominate conceptions of cultural 
trauma’ (159). However, Luckhurst does not elaborate on how this expanded trauma 
theory, where one incorporates posthuman subjectivity, would be configured. He points 
to texts such as Greg Egan’s ‘Reasons to be Cheerful’ (1999) and Charles Stross’ novel 
Accelerando (2005), where subjectivity has been completely altered through capacities 
for simulation and direct neurological interference, and Luckhurst argues that ‘these vi-
sions challenge us to address the rapid development of new scientific understandings 
that are likely to reconceptualise notions of trauma in the very near future’ (2014, 166). 
Although, as Luckhurst states, there is a necessity to reconceptualise trauma, one might 
still argue that ‘traditional’ trauma theory can serve as a beneficial angle from which to 
consider the posthuman subject, as many of the discussions provided by, for instance, 
Freud and Cathy Caruth are still highly relevant in an encounter with science fiction. 
Drawing on psychoanalysis, post-structuralism, and psychology, literary trauma 
theory developed in the later decades of the twentieth century, especially following 
the introduction of the PTSD diagnosis. The field draws major inspiration from Freud, 
one of the first philosophers to discuss trauma, although he revised his opinion about 
the nature of the concept several times. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) and 
Moses and Monotheism (1939), Freud debates symptoms, such as the nightmares of 
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soldiers after the war, in what he identifies as trauma victims. Cathy Caruth (1996), 
who is one of the leading trauma theorists today, interprets Freud’s definition of trauma 
as ‘an event that […] is experienced too soon, too unexpectedly, to be fully known and 
is therefore not available to consciousness until it imposes itself again, repeatedly, in 
the nightmares and repetitive actions of the survivor’ (4). Discussing the trauma of 
accidents, Caruth argues that the accident:
does not simply represent the violence of a collision but also conveys the impact of its very 
incomprehensibility. What returns to haunt the victim […] is not only the reality of the violent 
event but also the reality of the way that its violence has not yet been fully known (1996, 6). 
Trauma therefore revolves mainly around the individual’s inability to comprehend, 
or process, the traumatising event. This might have some interesting implications in 
light of artificial intelligence, which, like the human mind, would be engaged in an 
act of processing. Michelle Balaev (2008) similarly interprets trauma as becoming 
‘unrepresentable due to the inability of the brain, understood as the carrier of coherent 
cognitive schemata, to properly encode and process the event’ (151). The terminology 
here therefore suggests some evident links between the trauma experience and ma-
chine intelligence. Typical symptoms of trauma have been listed by Luckhurst (2008), 
drawing on the official diagnostic manual from the American Psychiatric Association, 
and include flashbacks, nightmares, avoidance of thoughts and feelings, loss of temper 
control, and hyper-vigilance (1). These are symptoms that we can identity in the post-
human trauma victims depicted in the texts this essay will be examining. 
Monstrous Wounds: Primal Trauma and 
Parental Rejection in Frankenstein 
Several critics have noted that Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein may have been a manifes-
tation of the author’s own traumatic experiences. Mark A. Rubenstein (1976) empha-
sises how the novel was influenced by Shelley’s loss of her mother, as well as the death 
of Shelley’s child shortly after his birth. These are aspects of trauma related to parent-
hood, family, and birth – significant themes that can contribute to an understanding of 
the traumas located in the novel. In the backdrop of the novel’s horror, trauma does, 
indeed, play a significant part. Examining the Creature’s psyche in light of trauma will 
reveal how the novel portrays a posthuman form of trauma while also advocating the 
need for this trauma to be acknowledged. The majority of psychoanalytic readings 
(such as Rubenstein’s and Sherwin’s (1981)) have been devoted to examining Victor’s 
psyche, when in reality the Creature’s psyche is equally important for understanding 
the novel. The Creature in Frankenstein has typically been attributed to the role of 
perpetrator, murderer, and antagonist, and hence he is also known as ‘the Monster’. 
Yet, by allowing the Creature to express his grief and by giving voice to his version 
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of the story, the novel clearly invites sympathy for the Creature and implies that his 
monstrosity derives from Victor’s failure in his role as a ‘parent’. The novel thus urges 
the reader to consider the Creature more as a victim rather than as perpetrator, and, 
considering Victor’s side of the story, presents these categories as fluid and unstable. 
There are several hints in the novel that the Creature does experience trauma and 
is capable of emotional reactions. As we learn from Victor’s account, the Creature is 
made from organic materials, both human and animal, and is somehow brought to life 
by Victor trying to ‘infuse a spark of being into the lifeless thing’ (Shelley 2017, 41). 
We can therefore assume that the Creature is humanoid, though not entirely human. 
The narrative reveals that he has highly developed cognitive abilities and that he ex-
periences strong emotions. This becomes particularly evident in the novel’s ending 
scene, where the Creature talks about his ‘wounds’ (Shelley 2017, 87), which is the 
translation of the word ‘trauma’ in Greek. He appears traumatised, speaking of his 
‘burning miseries’ and the ‘agonies which consume [him]’ (Shelley 2017, 186–87). If 
not directly showing symptoms of trauma, the Creature certainly experiences strong 
emotions, generated by the memories he has stored. It might also be suggested that 
the Creature exhibits more empathy and emotions than humans in many instance, as 
illustrated, for example, by his vegetarian diet: ‘my food is not that of man: I do not de-
stroy the lamb and the kid, to glut my appetite; acorns and berries afford me sufficient 
nourishment’ (Shelley 2017, 121). The Creature also experiences empathy towards 
other people through, for instance, his ability to observe the daily lives of the De Lacey 
family, listen to their stories, recognise their emotions, and assist them. As will also 
be the case with Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, empathy is one of the main 
‘symptoms’ of being human in Dick’s novel. 
The main source of the Creature’s trauma, one might argue, is, in fact, his own birth 
– a traumatising experience that is reinforced by Victor’s immediate rejection. Interest-
ingly, this is reminiscent of what many psychoanalysts, for instance, Freud and Wilfred 
Bion, theorise about birth in itself as a traumatic occurrence for the infant. Whereas 
Freud explains primal trauma in terms of how the infant loses connection with the 
mother, Wilfred Bion sees it as ‘an inevitable part of birth, because a baby is born with 
very limited ability to process its perinatal sense of impressions, which it will inevita-
bly find overwhelming’ (Crago 2016, 12). Bion’s picture of primal trauma seems very 
similar to what the Creature experiences during the early moments of his life, when he 
describes his first memories as ‘confused and indistinct’ (Shelley 2017, 83). Further-
more, he states ‘a strange multiplicity of sensations seized me, and I saw, felt, heard, 
and smelt, at the same time’, as if he cannot process what is happening (Shelley 2017, 
83). The birth of the Creature is made increasingly traumatic by Victor’s abandonment 
of his creation, and thus he prevents any form of contact or communication between 
the two from taking place. Shortly after Victor has fled the scene of the birth, the 
Creature comes into Victor’s bedroom, obviously seeking contact, with ‘one hand […] 
stretched out’ and muttering ‘some inarticulate sounds’ (Shelley 2017, 42–43). The 
Creature is therefore portrayed like a newborn overwhelmed by sense impressions. 
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The circumstances of the Creature’s birth become the recurring trauma that continues 
to haunt him throughout the story, as he struggles to comprehend Victor’s rejection: 
‘am I not alone, miserably alone? You, my creator, abhor me’ (Shelley 2017, 81). Paul 
Sherwin has similarly discussed the Creature’s experience of rejection and exclusion 
as catastrophic, asserting that:
the Creature’s utmost desire is that another reciprocate his need for sympathetic relationship, and 
even after he becomes searingly conscious of his exclusion from the human community and be-
gins to objectify the negativity he arouses in others, we recognize that his aggression is a by-prod-
uct of disintegration, not an innate drive that has been cathartically unbound (1981, 890). 
The Creature’s experience of his own exclusion therefore leads him to kill his vic-
tims. It is evident that his aggressive actions can be traced back to his trauma. 
Both Victor Frankenstein and Walton become witnesses to the Creature’s trauma. 
However, they always seem to be in disbelief, refusing to acknowledge it fully and to 
accept the Creature’s ‘humanity’. As will be shown at the end of this essay, the act of 
bearing witness to another’s trauma is of major importance in Le Guin’s short story, 
as the text demonstrates that human recognition of the posthuman’s ability to become 
traumatised can lead to successful encounters between human and humanoid. In Frank-
enstein, both Victor and Walton fail at this recognition. Walton admits to feeling empathy 
for the Creature at first seeing him and hearing his side of the story when the two meet 
following Victor’s death. ‘I was at first touched by the expressions of his misery’, Walton 
states, after having observed the Creature with ‘a mixture of curiosity and compassion’ 
(Shelley 2017, 184–85). But when Walton recalls Victor’s version of the tale, his em-
phatic response changes into rage and ‘indignation’ (Shelley 2017, 185). What Walton 
does not comprehend is that the Creature clearly suffers from some form of trauma and 
is desperate for the humans to acknowledge this. However, the humans’ narrow view of 
the psyche and their belief in human exceptionalism is too strong for this to happen, and 
as a result, the story becomes a tragedy for both Victor and the Creature, a human and 
a posthuman. Frankenstein thus becomes an important example of how much ‘damage’ 
artificial intelligence can do if humans do not acknowledge the full extent of their exist-
ence, their inner lives, and their potential to store memories, experiences, and process 
these episodes. In this way, the novel makes a significant contribution to posthumanism, 
particularly as it sheds light on the posthuman subject’s ability to become traumatised. 
Android Suffering: Trauma as Catalyst for Non-Anthropocentric 
Ontologies in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? 
Philip K. Dick’s novel Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? is concerned with the 
boundaries between human and posthuman, perhaps to an even greater extent than 
Frankenstein. In its attention to these borders, trauma becomes a significant motif. The 
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novel depicts a post-apocalyptic world where the majority of the human population has 
emigrated to Mars. Humanoid androids have been created, first as a form of war-technol-
ogy, so-called ‘freedom fighters’, but now functioning as servants for humans who emi-
grate. The job of protagonist Rick Deckard is to ‘retire’ those androids who have escaped 
to Earth, where their presence is illegal. This is something he accomplishes through 
performing an empathy test on the androids, as the only way to distinguish them from 
humans is to prove their alleged inability to empathise. As the narrative progresses, this 
distinction between human and android gradually falters. Commenting on Dick’s fiction 
in general, Roger Luckhurst (2005) states that the ‘protagonists find their locations in 
time and space subject to a bewildering disorder, as the fabric of reality distends, reveal-
ing a jerry-built artifice on the verge of collapse’ (107). Not only is this ‘bewildering dis-
order’ a major ontological trauma for the human characters in Do Androids Dream, but 
this is also the case for the androids. In the universe of the novel, humans are considered 
‘real’ and superior to the artificial androids in the same manner as ‘real’ animals are seen 
as superior to electric ones. As a result, the androids are consistently confronted with so-
cial conventions which assert their artificiality, as the characters we know to be androids 
continue to be reminded that they are not human, even though everything that happens in 
the narrative suggests that the human/android dichotomy is false. Furthermore, as Tony 
Vinci points out, if android trauma is considered a valid narrative of pain, it will threaten 
to revise the distinction between real and artificial (2014, 95). Since the novel indicates 
that android trauma is real, this is one of the main ways in which Dick initiates a broad-
ening of the ‘human’ concept and introduces posthuman trauma as a valid experience. 
The novel demonstrates this posthuman trauma in several ways. The most significant 
scene of android traumatisation is when Rachael, a Nexus-6 type android, discovers 
Deckard’s plans to retire Pris, an android who shares her physical features. Rachael is 
clearly upset and distracted by Deckard’s revelation: ‘she had turned pale and her voice 
shook. All at once she had become exceptionally unsteady’ (Dick 1999, 159). The scene 
demonstrates how Rachael feels empathy for Pris, and possibly for the other androids as 
well, something she confirms when Deckard suggests that she feels empathy (Dick 1999, 
161). In spite of the fact that Rachael may simply be simulating her empathetic response, 
the novel later implies that Rachael also has feelings and empathy for Deckard. Indeed, 
N. Katherine Hayles’s interpretation of Rachael’s character is that:
Rachael’s strategy implies that she feels empathy for her fellow androids, giving lie to the 
government’s position that androids feel no loyalty to each other. If she can care for her fel-
low androids, we may wonder if she also cares for Deckard, as she claims when she tells him 
that she loves him (173). 
In a manner highly reminiscent of the Creature’s murders in Frankenstein, Rachael 
proceeds to murder Deckard’s goat after he has ventured to retire the remaining an-
droids. Rachael’s unpredictable behaviour, it may be suggested, is symptomatic of her 
trauma. Rachael is traumatised by Deckard’s ultimate belief in her artificiality, which he 
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particularly demonstrates in how abruptly he decides to kill her but changes his mind 
again. Another contributing cause for Rachael’s trauma could of course also be Deck-
ard’s retirement of her fellow androids, which again underscores Rachael’s empathy. 
Regardless of Rachael’s motives, the act of murdering Deckard’s goat demonstrates Ra-
chael’s posthuman trauma, thereby both undermining the ontological framework that the 
Do Androids Dream society rests on and confirming the actuality of posthuman trauma. 
‘The Strangeness of the Stranger’: Encountering 
the Other Through Trauma in ‘Nine Lives’
Ursula K. Le Guin’s short story ‘Nine Lives’ depicts two humans stationed to work 
on a uranium mining project on the atmospherically hostile planet Libra. As the story 
begins, the men, Pugh and Martin, are joined by a crew of superhuman clones who ap-
pear to share an exceptionally close bond. The expedition transforms into a traumatic 
experience for one of the clones, Kaph, when his nine ‘siblings’ die in the impact of an 
earthquake. What is interesting about this story is the trauma that Kaph clearly suffers 
from following this event. It is evident that the episode manifests as a completely post-
human form of trauma because of the close connections that the clones share. What 
is significant, too, is the way in which this posthuman trauma leads to an encounter 
and a mutual understanding between human and humanoid. Le Guin’s story therefore 
highlights the importance of trauma as a mutual experience platform for a successful 
human/humanoid confrontation, and demonstrates that trauma can contribute to break-
ing down human perceptions of distinct boundaries between human and posthuman, 
much like in Dick’s novel. This theme is also emphasised by Le Guin’s choice of set-
ting; the stage where the trauma unfolds is itself portrayed as a traumatised place. The 
opening of the narrative describes the planet Libra in the following manner: ‘she was 
alive inside but dead outside […]. Underneath, in the black corridors, the halls beneath 
the skin, there were crepitations in darkness, ferments, chemical nightmares that went 
on for centuries’ (Le Guin 2010, 453) (my italics). This resonates with typical trauma 
symptoms such as nightmares, and one wonders whether Le Guin intentionally draws 
on trauma as a theme in this story. 
Like the Creature in Frankenstein and Rachael in Do Android Dream, Kaph is 
traumatised. His trauma arises from a distinct event: the loss of his siblings in the un-
expected event of an earthquake. This form of trauma, which stems from a sudden and 
incomprehensible incident, seems to correspond to Freud’s understanding of accident 
trauma. As previously mentioned, Freud imagines a person surviving a train accident 
unharmed, but with symptoms of trauma manifesting in the weeks after the accident. 
‘He develops a series of grave physical and motor symptoms, which one can ascribe 
only to his shock or whatever else happened at the time of the accident. He has devel-
oped “traumatic neurosis”’, Freud writes (1939, 119). Similarly, Kaph is in shock but 
physically unharmed when Pugh and Martin discover him at the site of the earthquake. 






Do Androids Have Nightmares About Electric Sheep? Science Fiction Portrayals…
He experiences seizures and choking for a long period of time after the accident, and 
when the seizures finally subside he appears apathetic, silent, and ‘staring into a dark-
ness that was not there’ (Le Guin 2010, 468). Pugh and Martin speculate on whether 
Kaph is experiencing the deaths of the nine other clones. ‘They were all of him, he 
is all of them. They died, and now he’s dying their deaths one by one’, they state (Le 
Guin 2010, 467). The full extent of Kaph’s trauma begins to dawn on Pugh and Martin 
as they continue to observe him. Additionally, what is noticeable about the two men is 
that they are afraid of Kaph, believing him to be unpredictable and capable of killing 
them. This eerie situation echoes the uncanniness at the beginning of the story when 
the humans meet the clones for the first time. Pugh and Martin are uncertain of what 
to make of the ten superhumans, and their scepticism towards them strengthens the 
distinct categories of ‘natural’ human and clone. Kaph’s unprocessed trauma, like the 
Creature’s trauma in Shelley’s novel, therefore poses a threat to the humans (or at least, 
this is what the humans believe), and the story hints at the fact that the posthuman’s 
ability to experience trauma should be acknowledged and dealt with by humans. 
What happens at the end of the short story, however, changes the men’s rigid per-
ceptions of the human category, and they become more attuned to and at ease with 
the posthuman. This transformation takes place through Kaph and the men witnessing 
each other’s trauma. Towards the close of the narrative, both Pugh and Martin expe-
rience traumas of their own as Martin is caught in the centre of an earthquake and 
Pugh sets out to rescue him. The situation causes Kaph to comprehend the two men’s 
affection for one another. The subsequent talk between Pugh and Kaph, which serves 
as the story’s ending scene, clearly alters the situation for Kaph: ‘his face was changed, 
as if he were glimpsing something he had not seen before; his voice too was changed’ 
(Le Guin 2010, 475). What Kaph now sees is Owen Pugh, ‘the thing he had never seen 
before […] the stranger who held his hand out in the dark’ (Le Guin 2010, 476). This 
scene can serve as an instance of how trauma can lead to an understanding with regard 
to the Other. This is something Cathy Caruth also emphasises in Unclaimed Experi-
ence (1996), where she argues that one’s own trauma ‘is tied up with the trauma of 
another’ and that ‘trauma may lead, therefore, to the encounter with another, through 
the very possibility and surprise of listening to another’s wound’ (8). This, one might 
argue, is exactly what ‘Nine Lives’ wishes to convey. The ‘strangeness of the stranger’ 
(Le Guin 2010, 455), particularly in a posthuman context, becomes less strange when 
it is recognised that both human and posthuman may suffer from trauma, and that this 
carries with it the potential for encounters and mutual understandings. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, the science fiction genre is invaluable in helping us abandon the an-
thropocentric worldview that has contributed to the advent of the Anthropocene. As 
shown here, one way that sci-fi texts achieve this is by illustrating that trauma is not 
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a uniquely human experience, but is also potentially experienceable by posthumans 
such as humanoid creatures, androids, and clones. Mary Shelley’s novel highlights 
the importance of human perceptibility to the needs and symptoms of a traumatized 
posthuman creation in order to prevent destructive behaviour from taking place. Do 
Androids Dream also demonstrates how androids have the potential to become trauma 
victims, although humans do not ‘allow’ them to. This in itself is traumatic for the an-
droids, and in Rachael’s character we clearly observe symptoms of human-like trauma. 
Finally, ‘Nine Lives’ is an example of how trauma can lead to reconciliation between 
human and posthuman, or human and Other, as theorized by Cathy Caruth. Through 
shared trauma, a successful encounter between Pugh, Martin, and Kaph ensues, and 
the strangeness of the Other becomes familiarised and safe. What these narratives have 
in common is their undermining of the rigid boundaries between human and non-hu-
man through the use of trauma as motif. Ultimately, all three narratives demonstrate 
that in a world of accelerating technological development, humans cannot hold on to 
the myth of anthropocentrism, but must accept the existence of the posthuman. 
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